Understanding the Party Brand: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Valence

Daniel M. Butler  Yale University
Eleanor Neff Powell  Yale University

The valence component of a party’s reputation, or brand, has been less scrutinized than other components of party-based theories of legislatures. This lack of scrutiny results from the difficulty of isolating the valence component from policy-related components and the difficulty of studying legislators’ motives. We overcome these challenges by conducting survey experiments on both voters and state legislators that show (1) that scholars have underestimated the impact of the party valence brand’s potential role in elections, (2) that legislative party leaders pressure members more on votes when the outcome affects the party valence brand, and (3) that the value of the party brand can sometimes directly affect legislators’ votes. Our results provide a rationale for why legislative leaders put so much effort into media spin battles and suggest that parties’ reputations affect legislative leaders’ ability to pass their agenda.

Stokes (1963) outlined two components of a party’s reputation, label or brand, that influence voters’ decisions and subsequent legislative action. First, party brands convey information about members’ ideologies or policy positions. Second, the valence component of the party brand changes voters’ support for a candidate based on the nonideological actions of her party.

The valence component of the party brand plays a vital role in understanding legislative politics. For example, scholars have used the valence component of the party brand to answer what Monroe and Robinson (2008) call the “core puzzle” of partisan theories of lawmaking: how do the relatively weak political parties in America, with their diverse and locally-elected members, influence legislative policymaking? Researchers have answered this question by arguing that legislators’ desire to improve the valence component of their party brand—thereby gaining an electoral advantage—leads rank-and-file legislators to give their party leaders the power to pressure them on roll-call votes (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger 2007).

Despite its importance, scholars have done little to test the valence component because of two formidable empirical hurdles. First, it is difficult to isolate the valence component from the ideological component of the party brand because their effects are often observationally equivalent. Second, the valence argument relies on assumptions about, and has implications for, three different sets of actors: voters, rank-and-file legislators, and legislative leaders. Although technological improvements have made it easier to conduct experiments on voters, it remains difficult to experimentally test the behavior and beliefs of legislators. We overcome these hurdles by conducting survey experiments on state legislators and voters.¹

Using state legislators to study the valence component of party reputations allows us the access necessary to isolate legislators’ perceptions of the consequences of the party brand. In the next section, we more fully discuss the trade-offs of using state legislators to study the valence component of the party brand. We then review the theoretical arguments about the party brand. Our subsequent survey of the empirical literature on the

¹An online appendix for this article is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613001436 whatever containing supplemental analyses. Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the article will be made available at http://isps.yale.edu/research.
party brand highlights the absence of empirical tests of the party brand’s valence component.

We start our empirical analysis with experiments on voters that investigate whether they reward/punish legislators for the nonideological actions of their party. Our results show that voters reward legislators for their party’s record of legislative performance and also punish legislators if their party is caught in a scandal. Further, these effects are larger in magnitude than factors that previous research has identified as being important determinants of citizens’ vote choice.

Our subsequent survey experiments on state legislators show that legislators respond to these incentives. Our first experiment on legislators finds that they believe that party leaders are more likely to pressure party members when they expect that passing the measure will improve the valence component of the party brand. We then conduct additional experiments on state legislators that show that a party’s reputation also directly influences their voting decisions, making legislators more likely to vote with their party leaders, but only when public opinion on the issue is split.

Our tests provide some of the first empirical findings on the valence dimension of the party brand at both the elite and citizen levels. While many of our findings are consistent with the assumptions and theories of previous literature, our empirical results show that we have been underestimating the role that valence plays in American elections and legislative politics. Valence has an impact on constituents’ vote choice.

These heretofore unrecognized dynamics help explain why legislative leaders put so much effort into media-spin battles as opposed to other legislative activities.

**Studying State Legislators**

The theoretical literature on Congress makes several predictions about how the valence component of the party brand affects legislators’ behavior. We conduct survey experiments on state legislators to test these predictions. The advantage of experimentally studying state legislators is that we have greater access to them (Butler, Karpowitz, and Pope 2012; Butler and Nickerson 2011). As a research community, we simply do not have the large-scale access to members of Congress necessary to conduct the type of survey experiments we do here. Indeed, other research designs could be used to study the party brand, but our design allows us to directly test legislators’ beliefs about the effect of valence. In other words, we are able to draw on the strengths of studying Congress (the well-developed theory) and the strengths of studying state legislators (the available data) to learn about American legislators.

State legislators are a particularly important subject pool because they are the closest possible comparable sample to members of Congress. Like Members of Congress, state legislators frequently face a trade-off when deciding what policies to support between their party leaders’ preferences and their constituents’ preferences. Further, because state governments are patterned after the national government, they bear striking similarities in institutional design, including the separation of powers, regular elections, and bicameralism. Finally, Members of Congress often serve in state legislatures earlier in their career. Fully 46% of U.S. Senators and 50% of U.S. House Members previously served as state legislators (National Conference of State Legislators 2013). Thus, the population from which we are drawing is also the population from which nearly half the Members of Congress are drawn.

Of course, using state legislators to test theories that have been developed in the Congressional literature raises questions. Can these theories about Congress be applied to state legislators? And, given that we study state legislators, can the results be applied to Members of Congress? When there are relevant differences between federal and state legislators or legislative institutions, it is inappropriate to use state legislators to test theories that have been developed with respect to Congress. The appropriateness of this approach to answer questions must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

In our case, we are studying a phenomenon that has its roots in the role of partisanship in legislative elections. With the exception of Nebraska—which we excluded from the sample because it is a nonpartisan legislature—the party brand plays an important role in both federal and state legislative elections. Although we suspect that partisanship plays an even larger role in state legislative elections because voters may have less information about candidates, it still plays a significant role in congressional elections. Further, given the size of the effects we find, even a muted effect is likely to be substantively important.

To be precise, there are no formal limitations on attempting to survey members of congress, but we think it would be difficult to obtain a sufficient sample size.
Moreover, we believe that our insights about state legislators are an important contribution in and of themselves as state legislators play a substantial role in determining the tax and spending policies that significantly affect constituents (Tax Policy Center 2013). We turn now to a review of the congressional literature on the party brand.

The Party Brand and Legislative Theory

Stokes (1963), in discussing voters’ decision-making process, draws a distinction between the positional and valence components of the party brand. Subsequent scholars have built on these two aspects of the party brand to theorize about how legislative leaders influence rank-and-file members. The first set of arguments focuses on the party brand as a type of valence advantage (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2009; Groseclose 2001). In this formulation, the party brand is modeled as an intercept term in the voter’s utility function. When a party brand is good (or takes a positive value), constituents are more likely to vote for members of that party. When a party brand is bad (or takes a negative value), the candidates from that party receive fewer votes. We refer to this aspect of a party’s brand as the *party valence brand*.

The second set of arguments build on the idea that the party brand is an informational shortcut that voters use to make inferences about candidates’ ideological positions. We refer to this aspect of a party’s brand as the *party policy brand*.

Significantly, the party valence brand is prominent in the theoretical literature on legislative organization, but not in the empirical literature. Instead, the empirical literature has focused on the party policy brand, which is why we focus on the empirically understudied valence argument (though we discuss both arguments to highlight our contribution to research on the party brand).

Valence-based arguments about the party brand, such as Cox and McCubbins’ (2005) Procedural Cartel Theory (see also Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger 2007), typically conceptualize the party brand as a valence term in voter’s utility function that depends on the party’s record of legislative accomplishment. As an example of how legislative accomplishment (or the absence of accomplishment) can influence the party brand in a negative fashion, Cox and McCubbins (2005) point to the damage to the Republican brand from the 1995 government shutdown.

If voters hold parties accountable for their legislative accomplishments (or lack thereof), then legislators have incentives to improve their party’s valence brand by helping pass their party leadership’s agenda. Legislators also have strong incentives, however, to vote in line with their constituents’ preferences. Because the party brand is a collective good, legislators will underinvest in its maintenance without some type of intervention. Party leaders provide that intervention by pressuring or otherwise encouraging members to support the party (Brady and McCubbins 2002; Grimmer and Powell 2013; Powell 2013).

It is also worthwhile to note that the party brand can have a direct effect on a member’s support for the party. Bianco (1994) argues that legislators have leeway to vote with their party when constituents trust them, which is most likely to occur when the party valence brand is high. This is another pathway by which the party valence brand can influence legislative outcomes.

The party policy brand argument, on the other hand, focuses on the party brand’s potentially informative function. In elections, voters must be sufficiently informed (or at least act as if they are sufficiently informed) to create meaningful nonrandom decisions (Arceneaux 2008; Druckman 2001). The party-policy brands serve as heuristic cues about candidates’ ideology (Grynaviski 2010; Peskowitz 2012; Snyder and Ting 2002). Because voters punish politicians for changing positions (Tomz and Van Houweling 2010), party members who will be running in the future, which includes most incumbent legislators, have incentives to maintain a consistent party policy brand (Wittman 1989).

What Do We Know about the Party Brand Empirically?

In terms of the party-policy brand, Woon and Pope (2008) use the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey to demonstrate that voters recognize the ideological content of party labels (Grynaviski 2010; Peskowitz 2012; see also Pope and Woon 2008). Another group of studies focus on the general-election costs incurred by members who vote with their party at high levels and accrue more ideologically extreme voting records (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Carson et al. 2010; Koger and Lebo 2012). These studies consistently find that voters appear to punish the more ideologically extreme incumbents who contribute to the creation of a stronger ideological brand (cf. Harbridge and Malhotra 2011).
These findings appear to contradict theories about the party brand, because the party brand is supposed to help legislators, not hurt them. However, the party valence brand argument is about the overall value of the label to the party and not, as these studies test, the variation observed between members serving together.\(^3\)

Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger (2007) make a similar point, arguing that partisan voting has a direct negative effect when members are voting with the party and against their constituents interests, but it has an indirect positive effect through legislative victories that enhance the party’s reputation. As these arguments imply, we cannot evaluate the party valence brand argument by simply looking at whether legislators who act in a more partisan way do better or worse on Election Day. Analogously, we cannot look at the candidate-level valence to test claims about the party valence brand.\(^4\)

In sum, the empirical literature on voters has largely focused on the party policy brand. Further, researchers have rarely tested the implications of the theoretical claims on legislators’ behavior (for recent exceptions, see Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger 2007; Grynaviski 2010), including implications for how legislators influence the party brand and how the party brand influences legislators. It is important to look at how the party brand can directly influence legislators, because party leaders are only likely to pressure members on a small portion of votes. To measure the full impact of the party brand, we must measure its effect on the level of pressure legislative leaders exert on members and its direct effect on legislators’ votes. This is difficult to do using observational data, because these processes are interrelated. Our experimental approach allows us to manipulate each part of this relationship independently in order to measure their separate effects. In the sections that follow, we test (1) how the party valence brand influences voters, (2) how leaders pressure members to build the party valence brand, and (3) the direct effect of the party brand on legislators’ votes.

**Does the Party Valence Brand Matter to Voters?**

We begin with survey experiments on the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) that test whether voters respond to the incumbent candidate’s party valence brand.\(^5\) We use survey experiments to study the electoral impact of the party valence brand to avoid concerns that confounding effects are in fact driving the results. For example, observational approaches struggle to distinguish whether electoral swings against a party are due to a poor reputation or whether it is simply because bad things are happening. Our experiments isolate the effects by presenting scenarios that hold all nontreatment factors constant.

For our first two experiments, we followed the template of Tomz and Van Houweling (2009), providing the CCES respondents with a brief summary of two competing candidates’ biographies and issues positions.\(^6\) Our 2010 experiment, which was on the October wave of the CCES, provided respondents with the following information about the candidates:

Non-partisan groups often provide voter guides with short descriptions of legislative candidates. We would like your opinion about two candidates who we refer to as Candidate A and Candidate B.

Candidate A is the incumbent from the majority party who has served in the legislature for 4 years. During the previous session [TREATMENT], he supports caps on carbon emissions and supports fining businesses that hire illegal immigrants.

Candidate B is the sitting mayor of a mid-size town in the district. During his time in office, his town has experienced slightly above average economic development and population growth. He opposes caps on carbon emissions and opposes fining businesses that hire illegal immigrants.

\(^3\)For further discussion on this point, see Cox and McCubbins (2007, 102).

\(^4\)Although good studies have examined the candidate-level valence directly (e.g., Stone and Simas 2010), these studies cannot tell us about the party-level valence. One could look at partisan electoral tides (Cox and McCubbins 2007, 104). However, there is disagreement about whether this is evidence for the party brand. Cox and McCubbins note that if one accepts the view that these tides are the result of actions outside of congressional control, say the result of rewarding the president’s party for a strong economy, then the prospects for “the remainder of [Cox and McCubbins’] argument—or for any argument that views congressional parties as instruments to improve the collective electoral fate of their members—are bleak,”(Cox and McCubbins 2007, 111–12).

\(^5\)Our experiments focus on incumbent candidates because the extant theoretical models explain how legislators behave while in office in anticipation of upcoming elections (Cox and McCubbins 2007)—thus a focus on incumbents seeking reelection.

\(^6\)For both CCES experiments, we chose issues that were part of the planning document for what questions would be asked in the CCES common content (Ansolabehere 2010). In both cases at least one of the two issues we chose was either not asked or was only presented to a randomly chosen subset of the sample. In the online appendix, we present results that control, when possible, for the constituent’s positions on these issues.
Based on these descriptions, which candidate would you vote for?

Candidate A
Candidate B

We assigned respondents, with equal probability, to one of the four treatment conditions given below (where the text in quotes was substituted into the text above in place of “[TREATMENT]”). We designed these treatments to capture nonideological information about a party’s actions that affect the party valence brand, including good actions (such as passing the budget on time) and bad actions (such as being caught in a scandal). The four treatments are:

- **Treatment 1 (passed the budget on time):** “His party passed the budget on time for the first time in 20 years”;
- **Treatment 2 (passed the budget late):** “His party passed the budget late for the first time in 20 years”;
- **Treatment 3 (rated as being ethical):** “Ethics watchdog groups have praised his party for being the most ethical in recent years”;
- **Treatment 4 (rated as being unethical):** “Ethics watchdog groups have condemned his party for being the least ethical in recent years.”

In the experiment, we showed respondents short biographies for candidates A and B and then asked them which candidate they would vote for based on these descriptions. The results of the experiment are presented in the first column of Table 1 and show that voters are sensitive to information about the incumbent’s party. Respondents who were told that candidate A’s party passed the budget on time were 12 percentage points more likely to vote for candidate A than those who were told that his party passed the budget late. The effect of the ethical ratings was even larger. Respondents who were told that candidate A’s party was praised for being the most ethical in recent years chose candidate A 60% of the time. In contrast, those who were told that candidate A’s party was condemned as being the least ethical in recent years, chose candidate A only 43% of the time; a 17 percentage point difference.⁷

While this strong evidence is consistent with the claim that the party’s nonideological actions affect voters’ support for the incumbent, an alternative interpretation is that respondents are simply using the party’s ethical rating to make inferences about the incumbent’s ethical behavior. In other words, the effect of the party’s valence brand in this area might be confounded with (inferred) information about the individual legislator.

In practice, this attribution may be a reason that party brands matter. Legislators try to claim credit for their party’s good actions (even if they did not contribute), and voters may assume that they are guilty by association when fellow party members are caught in scandal (even if they themselves did nothing wrong). In practice, we think that this likely captures the full effect of party brands in real-world politics.

However, we conducted a follow-up experiment on the 2011 CCES to see if we could still detect an effect even if respondents were not using information about the party to infer anything about the individual legislator. For the 2011 CCES, we provided the following information about two candidates:

Non-partisan ethics watchdog groups often rate legislators performance and provide voters with voter guides that include short descriptions of both legislative candidates. We would like your opinion about two candidates who we refer to as Candidate A and Candidate B.

Candidate A is the sitting mayor of a mid-size town in the district. During his time in office, his town has experienced slightly above average economic development and population growth. He opposes caps on carbon emissions and opposes a free trade agreement with South Korea.

### Table 1: Do Voters Punish Incumbent Candidates for their Party’s Behavior?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Variables (information about incumbent’s party)</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party passed budget on time</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party passed budget late</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage point difference</td>
<td>11.7* (t=2.34)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party rated as being ethical</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party rated as being unethical</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage point difference</td>
<td>17.0* (t=3.49)</td>
<td>7.8* (t=3.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>1,579</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data comes from the 2010 and 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election Surveys. T-statistics in parentheses. *p < 0.05.

⁷Results, estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and probit regression models, are presented in the online appendix and show that this difference holds when we control for the respondent’s partisanship, ideology, and issue positions.
Candidate B is the incumbent from the majority party who has served in the legislature for 4 years. He supports caps on carbon emissions and supports a free trade agreement with South Korea. The state’s ethics watchdog group gave the following ratings to Candidate B and his party:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B</td>
<td>A-</td>
<td>A-</td>
<td>A-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B’s Party</td>
<td>A-</td>
<td>A-</td>
<td>[TREATMENT]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on these descriptions, which candidate would you vote for?
Candidate A
Candidate B

We designed the experiment to provide ratings of both the candidate and his party to minimize the possibility that respondents were using the ratings about the party to make inferences about the ethical behavior of the incumbent candidate. We manipulated the ethical rating of the party such that half of the respondents were randomly chosen to learn that the party received an “A-” rating in 2011, and the other half were informed that the party received a “D” rating in 2011.

The last column of Table 1 shows that when his party’s ethics rating improved from a D to an A, voters became eight percentage points more likely to vote for Candidate B (a statistically significant difference).\(^8\) The fact that the result is about half the size of the results in the 2010 study may be an indication that the 2010 study was confounding the effects of the party’s valence brand with possible inferences about the incumbent’s own behavior. However, we need to be cautious in reaching any conclusions because we are using an alternative rating system (A-/D versus most/least ethical). Either way, when we isolate the party’s rating separately from any information about the individual legislator’s behavior, the party’s rating (and hence the party’s valence brand) significantly affects voters’ decisions.

While the CCES experiments have shown that the party’s valence brand significantly affects citizens’ vote choice, there are several unanswered questions. What is the baseline? Does a good valence brand help, a bad valence brand hurt, or both? How does partisanship affect the results? Do partisans react at all to the treatments? What is the size of the party valence brand effect relative to the size of the party policy brand effect?

To address these unanswered questions, we used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service in July 2013 to recruit respondents with IP addresses in the United States for a third survey experiment (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). At the beginning of the survey, before the experiment, we asked respondents about their partisanship, ideology, gender, highest level of education, and whether they voted in the 2012 presidential election (the full text of the survey is given in the online appendix). We then asked respondents to place themselves, the Republicans in Congress and the Democrats in Congress on an ideological scale ranging from 0 to 100 (See Figure 1). As we explain below, we used this question to help explore the effect of the party policy brand on citizens’ vote choice.

For the vignette, we asked the respondents how they would vote in state legislative elections in a nearby state. In the experiment, we randomized which party controlled the legislature and information about the state and the party in control of the legislature (the randomized parts are given in brackets and bolded):

In a nearby state they are having state legislative elections next year. Currently, \([\text{Republicans/Democrats}]\) control the state legislature.

[State unemployment is 1% [above/below] the national average.]

[Ethics watchdog groups have rated the [Republican/Democratic]-controlled legislature as the [most/least] ethical in recent years.]

[The [Republicans/Democrats] have passed the budget [on time/late] for the first time in twenty years.]

[A nonpartisan group has rated the [Republicans/Democrats] in the state legislature as more [liberal/conservative] than the [Republicans/Democrats] in the U.S. Congress.]

If you were in this state, how would you vote in the next election?

The first piece of information dealt with the state’s unemployment. We included this question because we wanted to compare the size of the effect of the party valence brand to an important benchmark—economic voting (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). The second and third pieces of information capture the aspects of the party valence brand we have been investigating in the other voter experiments (ethics and the timeliness of passing the budget). The fourth piece of information, which captures an aspect of the party policy brand, indicates the ideological location

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\(^8\) Results, estimated with OLS and probit regression models, are presented in the online appendix and show that this difference holds when we control for the respondent’s partisanship, ideology, and issue positions.
of the state legislative party relative to their copartisans in Congress. Because we also know how the respondents placed themselves relative to the two parties in Congress (see Figure 1), we can create variables that measure whether the party was ideologically closer or ideologically further from the respondent.\(^9\) We can thus see whether voters reward and/or punish politicians for their ideological positions.

Significantly, there are three treatments for each of these pieces of information. For example, a third of respondents did not hear anything about state unemployment, another third were told that it was 1% above the national average, and the last third learned that state unemployment was 1% below the national average.

Because we randomized which party controlled the state legislature, we can estimate how each of these pieces of information affects the political fortunes of each party. We estimate these returns by predicting whether the respondent said they would vote for the Republicans (the dependent variable = 1) or the Democrats (the dependent variable = 0). Table 2 presents the results of predicting the respondents’ vote based on the information in the vignette. Column 1 presents the regression using all of the voters in the sample. Columns 2–4 then present the results broken down by the respondent’s self-identified partisanship.

Due to space limitations, we do not include most of the control variables in the table (the full results can be seen in the online appendix). The controls include the respondents’ level of education, gender, whether they voted in the 2012 election and which party controlled the legislature. None of these factors have much of an effect on how respondents’ voted. One control variable that did predict respondents’ vote was their own partisanship. Column 1 shows that Republicans are 70 percentage points more likely to vote for the Republicans in the state legislative elections than are Democrats.

The information that we included in the vignette also affected vote choice. For example, if the Democrats in the state went from being rated as the most ethical to being rated as the least ethical, the respondent would be 25 percentage points more likely to vote against them. There was a similar 25 percentage point effect for the ethics ratings of the Republican party. Given that this effect is about a third of the size of the effect of partisanship, which is arguably the most important predictors of vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960), the ethics ratings for the party has a substantial effect on how citizens vote.

The results also show that, relative to the baseline, the parties benefit from good ethical ratings and suffer from bad ethical ratings. This pattern does not hold for the results relating to the timing of the budget. The effect of a late budget is not discernable from the no-information baseline. This likely reflects the Congressional politics of recent years where the parties rarely agree to move things forward resulting in gridlock. In our current environment, passing the budget late is simply not a knock on the parties; perhaps the respondents are just impressed that they passed the budget at all. Indeed, the point estimates

\(^9\)For example, a respondent who is more liberal than the Congressional Republicans and is assigned to the treatment that “rated the Republicans in the state legislature as more conservative than the Republicans in the U.S. Congress,” would be placed in the Republicans - Ideologically Further category. If that same respondent had been assigned instead to the treatment that the Republican state legislators were more liberal (than the national congressional Republicans), then he would be placed in the Republicans - Ideologically Closer category. Because we are using this information to test the importance of the party policy brand, we dropped the 6% of respondents who misplaced the parties (i.e., those who marked that Democrats in Congress are more conservative than the Republicans in Congress). We dropped these respondents to make sure that the party policy brand had the best chance of success, thus providing the party valence brand a stiffer test. Including these respondents in the analysis has almost no effect on the estimates of the party valence brand’s effect.
### Table 2: The Party Policy Brand Versus The Party Valance Brand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Vote Republican Variables</th>
<th>(1) All Voters</th>
<th>(2) Independents</th>
<th>(3) Democrats</th>
<th>(4) Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment Treatments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats - high unemployment</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats - low unemployment</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>-0.225*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans - high unemployment</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>-0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans - low unemployment</td>
<td>0.095*</td>
<td>0.132*</td>
<td>0.074*</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethical Treatments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats - most ethical</td>
<td>-0.109*</td>
<td>-0.193*</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats - least ethical</td>
<td>0.149*</td>
<td>0.145*</td>
<td>0.181*</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans - most ethical</td>
<td>0.152*</td>
<td>0.255*</td>
<td>0.141*</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans - least ethical</td>
<td>-0.114*</td>
<td>-0.136*</td>
<td>-0.091*</td>
<td>-0.182*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Budget Treatments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats - budget on time</td>
<td>-0.104*</td>
<td>-0.170*</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats - budget late</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans - budget on time</td>
<td>0.160*</td>
<td>0.216*</td>
<td>0.118*</td>
<td>0.166*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republicans - budget late</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.003</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
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<td><strong>Ideology Treatments</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrats - ideologically closer</td>
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<td>-0.162*</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats - ideologically further</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.165*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans - ideologically closer</td>
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<td>0.073*</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans - ideologically further</td>
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<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.381*</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.398*</td>
<td>0.291*</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.892*</td>
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<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
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<td>Other controls included?</td>
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<td>880</td>
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<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.213</td>
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</table>

Note: Other controls: education levels, gender, voted in 2012 election, and Democratic control of the legislature. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05.
suggest that if anything the parties do slightly better when respondents are told that they passed the budget late (though the result is statistically insignificant). By contrast, voters reward the parties for passing the budget on time. When the Republicans pass the budget on time, respondents are 16 percentage points more likely to vote for them. Similarly, Democrats enjoy a 10 percentage point boost for passing the budget on time.

These effects are larger than the effects related to changes in unemployment in the vignette. Voters punish both parties by about three percentage points for having high unemployment (1% above the national average), and both are rewarded for low unemployment, though Republicans enjoy a slightly larger benefit (perhaps reflecting our respondents’ expectations about the parties’ priorities in regard to unemployment). Still, even for Republicans the two percentage point movement in unemployment only moves respondents’ vote choice by 12 percentage points (it is only a six percentage point change for Democrats). Outside of partisanship, economic voting is one of the more important predictors of vote choice. Still, we see that the aspects of the party valence brand move voters by more than a change of 2% in unemployment.

The results of the experiment also show that the party policy brand is an important predictor of vote choice. The results in column 1 show that there is about a 10 percentage point difference in respondents’ vote choice when a party goes from being “further” from them ideologically to being “closer” to them ideologically. The results further show that most of this result comes because voters reward both parties when they are ideologically closer to them. By contrast, they do not punish the parties much when they are further away ideologically. This suggests that voters’ baseline expectation is that the parties are already ideologically distant from them. Most importantly the political returns of changing the party policy brand are actually smaller than the political returns from changing the party valence brand (at least as conceptualized here).

The results in columns 2–4 show that independents are particularly sensitive to information about the party valence brand. The party valence brand still matters to partisans (see columns 3 and 4), but it matters even more for Independents. Because Independents often act as the median voter in elections, these results further highlight the strong incentives that politicians have to improve their party valence brand. Whether it reflects the party’s legislative performance or their ethical behavior, the parties’ valence brands affect individual legislators’ electoral fortunes.

Legislative Leaders and the Party Valence Brand

Do party leaders act on the incentive to improve their party’s valence brand by pressuring members to vote with the party when passing legislation that would improve the party valence brand? A major advantage of our study is that we use a survey experiment on state legislators to test this prediction. The experiment was part of a survey that was created with the web-based program Qualtrics and Emailed to state legislators in the United States in March 2012. A full description of the survey is presented in the online appendix.

Because the survey was administered via the web, we knew that sometimes staff members would be filling out the survey. In order to help account for this, our first question on the survey asked the respondent whether they were a state legislator or a staff member. We present all of the results with the self-identified state legislator subsample; the results with the full sample are presented in the online appendix and are, if anything, even stronger.

In administering the survey, we tried to keep the length under five minutes because of concerns about burdening state legislators. We kept the survey short by administering some of the longer questions (including the survey experiments in this and the next section) to only a subsample of the respondents. Thus, although the overall response rate for the survey was about 15% (a total of over 1,000 responses), any individual question was shown to only a randomly chosen sample of about 150 respondents.10

The party-pressure experiment presented respondents with a short vignette about party leaders who can only pass the budget on time if two members representing districts that are not happy with the current budget vote to pass it anyways (the full vignette is presented in the appendix). We chose to use a bill that was close to passing because this is where we would most likely expect a leader to exercise pressure and where it would be most important if they did so (Snyder and Groseclose 2000). The vignette ends by asking the respondents whether they think that the leaders will pressure these members to pass the budget. The key to the experiment is that the vignette signals, and randomly varies, how important passing the budget on time is for the party valence brand by reporting the results of the following public opinion poll question:

10A response rate of 15% is actually higher than recent Internet surveys that have produced representative samples of state legislators (Fisher and Herrick 2013).
Is the [Adjective Form of Legislator’s Party] majority’s ability to pass the budget on time likely to be a deciding factor in whether you would vote to return the [Adjective Form of Legislator’s Party] majority to power next year?

Respondents were randomly assigned to either see that 72% of voters answered yes (and 28% answered no) or that only 18% of voters answered yes (and 82% answered no). In other words, half of the respondents were told that voters would use this roll call in deciding how to vote in the next legislative election, and half were told that voters would not use this as a major consideration. Table 3 shows that over 70% of respondents thought the party leaders would pressure the members to vote for the budget even if passing it on time did not affect the valence of the party brand. In other words, legislators thought that party leaders were likely to pressure members on this vote regardless of its effect on the party’s valence brand. We think this reflects the fact that budgets are one of the most important tools that the legislature has for affecting policy. Assuming that legislators care about policy, they have a strong incentive to help the budget pass on time because it directly affects many of the policies they care about.

Despite the high level of whipping in the control condition, it is even higher in the treatment condition. Legislators who learned that the budget vote would affect the party’s valence brand were 12 percentage points more likely to say that the party leaders would exert pressure on the moderate members. This might actually be a lower bound because of the potential ceiling effect due to the high level of whipping in the control condition. If we looked at an issue that had less policy significance for so many legislators but still had a strong effect on the party brand, we would expect an even larger treatment effect.

**Does the Party Brand Directly Affect Legislators’ Votes?**

We have shown that legislative leaders work to build their party valence brand when they expect an electoral return for their party. However, because leaders have a limited amount of capital (both carrots and sticks), they are only likely to pressure members on a small portion of thousands of votes taken during a legislative session. Although such party pressure on close votes is an important way in which the party valence brand can affect legislative outcomes, only looking at the behavior of party leaders will underestimate the importance of the party valence brand if it also has a direct effect on how legislators vote. In this section, we test whether legislators directly respond to variation in support of their party (a measure of the party valence brand) when deciding how to vote.

We conducted two survey experiments on state legislators to evaluate whether the party brand has a direct impact on legislators’ votes. These experiments were part of the larger survey that was conducted in spring 2012 (see the description in the previous section). Again, while the overall response rate for the survey was about 15% (a total of over 1,000 responses), we asked these longer survey questions to only a subsample of about 150 respondents in order to keep the survey close to the targeted five-minute time frame.

For these experiments, we gave respondents a vignette about a legislator who was considering whether to vote for a bill supported by their party leaders (the full text of the vignette is in the appendix). The respondents were given two pieces of information from a recent public opinion poll of voters in his/her district: (1) the percent of voters in the district who favored the bill and (2) the generic party ballot for voters in the district (i.e., what percent of voters intended to vote for the legislator’s party in the next election). The downside to using the generic party ballot is that voters use both valence and policy considerations when answering this question. Voters might like the party because it is accomplishing voters’ ideological goals or because of its nonideological actions. We cannot fully resolve this ambiguity, but our July 2013 voter experiment specifically used the language of the generic party ballot as the outcome measure. The results of that experiment (see Table 2) suggest that the party valence brand is a significant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Do Leaders Pressure in Expectation of Improving the Party Valence Brand?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment Variables (reaction to party passing budget late)</td>
<td>Dependent Variable: Percent who Say That Party Leaders Will Pressure Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote will affect party valence brand</td>
<td>84.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote would not affect party valence brand</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage point difference</td>
<td>12.1 (&lt;i&gt;t&lt;/i&gt;=1.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: T-statistics in parentheses. *p < 0.05. The response rate for the survey was about 15% (over 1,000 responses total), but we asked these longer survey questions to only a subsample of about 150 respondents to keep the survey close to the targeted five-minute time frame.
determinant of the generic party ballot (perhaps even more significant than the party policy brand). Further, the generic party ballot is the type of information that legislators might actually use in practice when trying to estimate the value of their party’s valence brand.

We varied the results of the generic party-ballot poll question to see whether legislators were more likely to vote with the party leaders when the value of the party valence brand was higher (i.e., when more people intended to vote for the party in the next election). In the low-valued treatment, only 29% of the voters indicated that they were planning to vote for the legislator’s party (with 65% planning to vote for the opposite party and 6% undecided). In the high-valued treatment the numbers were reversed with 65% of the voters indicating that they were planning to vote for the legislator’s party (with 65% planning to vote for the opposite party and 6% undecided). In the middle-valued treatment the numbers were reversed with 65% of the voters indicating that they were planning to vote for the legislator’s party (with 65% planning to vote for the opposite party and 6% undecided). In the high-valued treatment the numbers were reversed with 65% of the voters indicating that they were planning to vote for the legislator’s party (with 65% planning to vote for the opposite party and 6% undecided).

In the first experiment, we portrayed the voters in the district as being split about the merits of the bill with 45% favoring passage, 46% opposing passage, and 9% expressing no opinion. In the second experiment the voters were against the bill with only 34% favoring passage (and 57% opposing passage and 9% expressing no opinion). The two experiments were thus designed to capture the situation in which voters are split on the measure and the situation when they are opposed to the measure. In all other ways, the two experiments were the same. We did not conduct a third experiment where voters supported the measure because theoretically it is a much less interesting case; if constituents and party leaders both supported the measure in our vignette, there would be no reason to expect legislators to vote against the measure.

The first column of Table 4 shows the results from the experiment where voters are split on the measure. When voters are split, legislators are responsive to the value of their party brand. Respondents exposed to only the low-valued treatment are about 19 percentage points less likely to think that the legislator would vote with the party leaders than were their counterparts who saw the high-valued treatment. In contrast, the last column of Table 4 shows that when constituents opposed the bill (only 34% favored passage), there is almost no difference in the outcome for the low-valued and high-valued party-brand treatments.

Significantly, the value of the party brand only has a direct effect on how legislators vote in cases where voters are split. What might explain why the party brand has a heterogeneous treatment effect? It cannot be explained by the idea that legislators simply vote against the party when they are unpopular as a way to bolster their own electoral position (Carson et al. 2010). If that was the underlying dynamic, then we would expect the value of the party brand to have a treatment effect in both experiments.

Bianco (1994) provides a possible explanation for the observed heterogeneous treatment effect. Bianco argues that legislators have leeway on their votes when two conditions are met: (1) constituents are uncertain about the proposal and (2) constituents trust the legislator to act in their interest. The logic is that when voters know exactly what they want, legislators need to respond to those preferences. However, when the constituents are uncertain about an issue (e.g., when they are split on the measure), the legislators can exercise more discretion if voters trust them. One possibility is that the party brand’s value captures constituents’ level of trust for the legislator’s party (and thus the legislator), and the opinion on the bill captures constituents’ uncertainty about the proposal. This view suggests that we see no treatment effect when constituents are opposed to the bill because the legislator has no leeway in that case; legislators respond to their constituents’ clear preference. In contrast, when voters are split on the measure, legislators can exercise leeway to vote more with their party if constituents trust her party.

### Conclusion

The party brand can be divided into two distinct elements: the party valence brand and the party policy brand. The party policy brand captures the idea that voters infer the ideological position of (at least some) candidates based on their party brand and has received more attention in the empirical literature.
The idea behind the party valence brand is that voters hold politicians accountable for the nonideological actions of the party as a whole and not just the behavior of the individual legislator. This argument is the foundation for important work that has connected party organization to legislators’ electoral incentives. The key claim is that because the party valence brand affects incumbents reelection prospects, legislators and their party leaders have incentives to improve the value of their party’s valence brand. Prominent theories argue that this desire to improve the party valence brand is why legislators empower legislative leaders to enforce party discipline.

Despite the importance of the party valence brand in explaining how parties in legislatures function, it has not received much attention in the empirical literature. In part this is because the two aspects of the party brand are interrelated. A party’s ability to get things done—a key aspect of the party valence brand—is often measured by the degree to which a party passes it’s ideological agenda, which is directly related to the party policy brand. We employed a series of survey experiments with voters and state legislators to isolate, to the best extent possible, the effect of the party valence brand.

Our results help answer three fundamental questions about the party valence brand:

1) Does a party’s record of legislative accomplishment influence constituent’s voting decisions?
Yes. Voters reward legislators for their party’s record of nonideological legislative performance. Further, the size of this effect is comparable, and sometimes even larger, in magnitude to other important determinants of vote choice.

2) Do legislative leaders act in anticipation of affecting the party valence brand?
Yes. Legislators believe that leaders exert more pressure when the outcome of a legislative-performance vote (passing the budget) is likely to affect constituents’ voting decisions at the polls.

3) Does the party brand ever influence legislator’s voting decisions directly in the absence of pressure from the leadership?
Yes and no. When constituents are strongly opposed to a bill, a stronger party brand will not induce a legislator to vote with the party. When constituents are split on a bill, a stronger party brand will induce legislators to vote with the party.

Our results provide support for the assumptions and theories of previous literature, but they also yield new insights. For example, our results show that it is only when constituents are split on an issue that a strong party brand can directly induce a member to vote with his or her party. Relatedly, it is only with these empirical tests that we can begin to make claims about the relative magnitude and impact of these different factors on constituent opinion and legislative behavior. While we are hesitant to overgeneralize from our survey experiments, we provide preliminary evidence that parties, politicians, and political scientists are underestimating the importance of the party valence brand in shaping elections and legislative politics. We find that the ethics and governance (passing the budget on time) treatments move voters more than the economic voting and ideological proximity treatments.

A party’s valence brand is both substantively important and relatively easy to change. Indeed, parties do not always actually have to change their behavior to affect their party valence brand. Perceptions are an important part of the party valence brand.

One way legislative leaders affect voters’ perceptions of the parties’ valence brands is through winning the media spin battle (Sellers 2010). Party leaders engage in spin to take credit for good outcomes and shift blame to the other party for bad outcomes. This behavior is partly about electioneering, but it also helps leaders achieve their legislative agenda. When leaders successfully build up the party brand, legislators are more willing to vote for the party agenda because this gives them the leeway that comes from having their constituents’ trust. The desire to pass legislation also explains why leaders engage in this type of brand-building activities at the beginning of a legislative session when elections are still two years away. As researchers, we cannot fully evaluate the impact that party leaders have on legislative outcomes without evaluating both the direct and indirect paths through which they influence their rank-and-file members.

Consistent with the incentives to indirectly influence party loyalty, legislative leaders have increased the amount of resources they devote to communications. As late as 1976, the U.S. Senate leadership was not devoting any staff to communications, but by 2012, about 45% of leadership staff was working on communication (Lee 2013). A similar pattern exists in the U.S. House and applies to both parties. Leaders have incentives to invest resources in the media-spin battle, because doing so increase their party’s electoral prospects and strengthens their ability to pass their agenda (or at least to hamper the opposition from doing so).

A downside of this trend is that the legislative parties are putting more resources into appearances and less into governing. However, legislative leaders
are simply responding to their incentives; it is less costly to work on changing voters’ perceptions of the party valence brands, and yet there are high returns from doing so.

Because of the high stakes involved, we expect the media-spin battle to continue to be important. We also expect it to skew in the negative direction, reflecting the reality that a tremendous amount of partisan activity is aimed at harming the opposition party’s reputation. Weakening the opposition increases the relative strength of one’s own position in a two-party system. This negative side to the party valence brand is entirely consistent with the evidence presented here and the incentives created by the media’s focus on negative news (Niven 2001), yet it is an underappreciated component of these theories that in many ways mirrors the empirical reality of American politics today.

Appendix: Legislative Survey Experiments

Party-Pressure Experiment (Results in Table 3)

We’ll start with several scenarios involving different legislators. Tell us how you think each legislator would act.

Scenario #: {Adjective Form of Legislator’s Party} leaders who control the state legislature are two votes short of passing the budget on time. Days before the budget vote, a reputable firm releases the following poll result:

Question: “Is the {Adjective Form of Legislator’s Party} majority’s ability to pass the budget on time likely to be a deciding factor in whether you would vote to return the {Adjective Form of Legislator’s Party} majority to power next year?

Yes - [72/18]%
No - [28/82]%

To pass the budget on time, two {Adjective Form of Legislator’s Party} members who come from moderate districts where voters are unhappy with the current budget need to vote for the budget. Do you think that {Adjective Form of Legislator’s Party} leaders in this situation are likely to pressure these members to vote for the budget?

Yes, they will pressure these members to vote for the budget
No, they will not pressure these members to vote for the budget

The Party Brand’s Direct-Effect Experiment (Results in Table 4)

Scenario #: The day before the legislature votes on a bill that the {Adjective Form of Legislator’s Party} leaders in the chamber are trying to pass, a reputable polling firm releases the following poll of 600 voters in a {Adjective Form of Legislator’s Party} legislator’s district:

Question 1: Attitude on the Bill.

Favor Passage [Noun Form of Legislator’s Party] - [65/29]%
Oppose Passage [Noun Form - Other Party] - [29/65]%
No Opinion - 9% Undecided - 6%

Question 2: Vote Intention in Next Election.

How do you think the {Adjective Form of Legislator’s Party} legislator who represents this district would vote on this bill?

Vote to pass the bill
Vote against the bill

References


Daniel M. Butler is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Institution for Social and Policy Studies at Yale University, New Haven, CT, 06511.

Eleanor Neff Powell is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Institution for Social and Policy Studies at Yale University, New Haven, CT, 06511.